Posted: May 21st, 2011 | Author: noam | Filed under: In the News, The Right, The Settlements, the US and us | Tags: Barak Obama, Benjamin Netanyahu, dennis ross, Jerusalem, peace process, pre-67 borders | Comments Off
Even as the two leaders reveal their differences, the White House continues to oppose both the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation and the Palestinian Authority’s moves at the UN – without getting anything from Jerusalem in return
Daily papers are not printed in Israel on Saturdays – weekend editions are distributed on Fridays, and the political commentary pieces go to press on Thursday afternoons. U.S. President Barack Obama gave his speech on the Middle East on Thursday evening, and throughout the week, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s people insisted, both on and off the record, that the speech not be too hard on Jerusalem. The new national security advisor, Yaakov Amidror, actually denied a story on Yedioth Ahronoth reporting his knowledge that President Obama would mention the pre-1967 borders in his remarks, claiming that “the only correct thing in this piece was my and the former NSA’s name.”
Well, Obama did mention borders, and Netanyahu made some harsh comments on Thursday night, declaring that he “expects to hear a reaffirmation from President Obama of U.S. commitments made to Israel in 2004.” So it happened that while the newspapers’ weekend political sections and op-ed pages reflected a somewhat smooth ride for Netanyahu in Washington, the front pages told the story of a new rift between the American president and the Israeli prime minister.
The confrontation couldn’t have been clearer after the White House meeting between the two leaders. Netanyahu even went so far as declaring his opposition to the president’s positions to his face – before lecturing him on Jewish history and Middle East politics. There wasn’t even an attempt made to disguise their differences and mutual mistrust.
Netanyahu’s problem is not so much with the White House, which already made it clear that it would not support a Palestinian unilateral declaration of independence. In recent weeks, Israel launched a diplomatic counter attack, aimed at bringing as many European countries as possible to vote against the Palestinian initiative at the United Nations in September. But when the U.S. administration publicly confronts Netanyahu, more countries are likely to go a step further and take diplomatic initiatives that support the Palestinians. In the past, anonymous proxies to Netanyahu told the Israeli press that they suspect the White House is behind some such moves on the part of the Europeans. Similar theories are now likely to reemerge, and perhaps we will even see a return to the rhetoric of “Obama as Pharaoh,” which was sounded by government ministers in the months after the elections.
Netanyahu’s harsh response to the president – both in his Thursday statement and in his comments after the White House meeting – suggests that he intends to maximize the political capital such a confrontation might bring him with his base. So far, the diplomatic deadlock and the growing isolation of Israel have not hurt Netanyahu with the public, and according to recent polls, if elections were held today, their results would be pretty similar to the previous ones. If, on the other hand, the prime minister were to embark on a serious peace initiative, his coalition is likely to collapse. Netanyahu knows that, and he is unlikely to agree to any concessions before November 2013, when new elections are scheduled. The problem is that even those elections could result in the same coalition and political pattern.
I must admit that the logic behind the U.S. administration’s move is not entirely clear to me. There is no hope of launching meaningful negotiations anytime soon. Even if the president can somehow get Netanyahu and Abbas into the same room – a very unlikely scenario, given the political circumstances on both sides and the proximity of elections – one can say with some certainty that nothing would come of it.
At the same time, the White House opposes both the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation and the Palestinian Authority’s moves at the UN, and might even to do some work behind the scenes in support of Israel’s positions on these issues – without getting anything from Jerusalem in return. In fact, a substantial opposition to the Palestinian UN effort is likely to strengthen Netanyahu at home, and could even secure his re-election. Does the administration hope that by confronting both sides we might achieve a breakthrough before September? I find it hard to believe. PM Netanyahu made it clear he will never allow a real Palestinian state, so it’s time to look for new paths to end the occupation.
The solution, I believe, lies the in recognition of the Palestinians’ right to oppose the occupation through diplomacy, as well as in support of growing non-violent protests and in respect for their political choices. This road might take longer to achieve results, but the alternative could be a recipe for the renewal of violence, once the current path leads to its inevitable dead end.
Posted: February 14th, 2011 | Author: noam | Filed under: In the News, The Right, The Settlements, the US and us | Tags: avigdor lieberman, Barak Obama, Benjamin Netanyahu, Bernard Avishai, ehud olmert, Mahmoud Abbas | 11 Comments »
The Israeli leadership wants to hold on to the status-quo, the Palestinian leadership is split, and the US discovers the limits of its power. Under these circumstances, the problem is not the lack of solutions for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but the absence of political forces that could implement them. A response to Bernard Avishai
Olmert, Abbas and Bush at the opening of the Annapolis talks (U.S. Navy photo by Gin Kai)
Some 20 years ago, just before I started my mandatory service in the IDF, I remember reading “No Trumpets, No Drums” by Sari Nusseibeh & Mark Heller. The Israeli and Palestinian authors of the book conducted negotiations for several months, leading to the outline of the two-state solution described in the book. At the time, the idea of a Palestinian state was still a taboo for most of the Israeli public, even in the Left, and I still remember going through the book and realizing that there might, after all, be a solution to what used to be called “the Palestinian problem.”
Reading Bernard Avishai’s excellent piece on the negotiations between Olmert and Abbas in this week’s edition of the New York Times Magazine, I couldn’t help remembering “No Trumpets, No Drums.” The similarities between the agreement Nusseibeh and Heller reached and the ideas discussed by the Israeli Prime Minister and the Palestinian president were striking, only this time they didn’t bring any sense of hope with them.
Another memory: Recently, I attended a public peace conference hosted by an Israeli-Palestinian NGO. Between the formal debates, I had a few conversations with representatives of different peace groups. Over dinner, one of them told me of a peace plan he came up with. “It’s not that different from the Geneva Initiative,” he admitted, “only with a few modifications.” A businessman I met was working on establishing an Israeli-Palestinian civilian think tank. His goal: To come up with a plan for a two-state solution…
In recent years, I have also met plenty out-of-the-box thinkers: People proposing a formula for a Palestinian-Israeli confederation; those who dream of abolishing national borders in the Middle East; and even a guy who claims that the Palestinians are the lost Jewish tribes, and therefore, see no reason for the conflict. All we need, he told me, is to explain this to people.
In short, there is no shortage of solutions (and it’s not surprising the serious ones look quite similar). The more the situation on the ground deteriorates, the more plans people come up with. I guess it’s only natural, and I don’t want to dismiss this tendency altogether. Ideas are important. They show people that the current trends can change, and they can lead to political action. The problem, I think, is that in recent years, all these plans and ideas replaced politics, and therefore, became counter-productive.
Many people looked at the failed Annapolis process as a missed opportunity, a version of the “generous offer” narrative used to describe the Camp David summit in 2000. Look how close the two sides are, these people say. If only the administration was more engaged we could have had an agreement. If only the war in Gaza didn’t break out. If only Ehud Olmert stayed in power.
But wasn’t the war evidence to the fact that it’s impossible to sign an agreement with only half the Palestinian Authority, and leave Gaza out of the process? And didn’t the result of the Israeli elections prove that the public prefers Netanyahu’s rejectionism to Kadima’s two-state platform? Couldn’t the failure to reach an agreement serve as proof that at least one of the parties – if not both – find the negotiation’s outcome impossible to live with, or simply impractical?
I believe that the problem is not the absence of a plan, but that of a leadership which is able to carry it out. Olmert went further than any Israeli leader, but he still didn’t come close to the minimum the Palestinians could have lived with (the reaction to the Palestine Papers reveals how far behind from its leadership was the Palestinian public). And while the Israeli PM was negotiating, Netanyahu and Lieberman warned of these “dangerous concessions” and made it clear that the next Israeli government would not see itself committed to the understandings between the lame-duck Prime Minister and the Palestinian President (when the crucial meetings between the two leaders took place, Olmert has already announced he would retire form his post due to corruption allegations, and that he wouldn’t run for re-election). It seems that the talks between Olmert and Abbas were closer in spirit to the Nusseibeh-Heller negotiations or to the talks that led to the Geneva Accord than to the Oslo process: full of good-will, but short on political authority that could back it up.
How do we get out of this dead-end? Avishai thinks that the US should present its own peace plan, based on the points of agreement between Olmert and Abbas. He writes on his TPM blog:
The point is, an Obama plan should be presented first to (and coordinated in advance with) the EU, the Quartet, the leaders of the OECD, and congressional leaders for that matter. It should be declared consistent with Olmert’s offer and designed (as Olmert’s offer was) to be “in the spirit” of the Arab League Initiative of 2002. Its great victory would not be in (immediately) getting Israelis and Palestinians to yes, but in creating an international consensus which all sides, especially Netanyahu and Israeli leaders and journalists more generally, would have to contend with for the foreseeable future. Obama could make the plan concrete by, for example, offering to provide funding for the RAND Corporation’s ARC project, tying a Palestinian state together with a transportation corridor, and offering Israeli infrastructure companies the chance to participate.
In the NYT piece, Avishai explains:
It is hard to imagine Netanyahu resisting an Obama initiative should the president fully commit to an American package based on these talks and rally the E.U., Russia and the United Nations.
Is it so hard to imagine? Some described the moratorium deal offered by the Administration last autumn as the best ever for Israel, and yet, Netanyahu rejected it. And it wasn’t even about a full peace treaty, just 90 days of settlement freeze, a good-will move that would enable negotiations to move forward.
Right now, there is no political force in Israel which is able to carry out the evacuation of settlements necessary for a peace deal, or to sell the Jewish public the return of dozens to hundred of thousands of Palestinian refugees. Without those, there would be no peace. There could be some intermediate treaty or a unilateral withdrawal, but it won’t bring peace.
The current Israeli leadership can’t even agree on a peace plan that would hand the Palestinians 60 percent of the West Bank, as some ministers proposed. The Knesset has a block of 60-65 members that would never agree to the concessions offered by Ehud Barak in Camp David, let alone those negotiated by Olmert. That’s the reason for the absence of peace talks – there is nothing to discuss.
If we had learned something during President Obama’s first couple of years, it’s his administration’s limits in applying effective pressure on a determined rightwing Israeli government. The administration tried to play it tough, but Netanyahu called their bluff – and won. Many people in Israel and Palestine, including myself, were hoping for a better outcome, but I don’t think the administration is to blame, in spite of mistakes it made. The political circumstances are such that applying pressure on Jerusalem is simply too expensive, in terms of political currency. A president might lose a lot by confronting an Israeli PM, and gain very little. Perhaps that’s the reason that the last two presidents pushed their peace plan just as they were getting ready to leave the White House.
So, what should the US do? In my opinion, the answer is not much, at least for the time being. As recent events taught us, there are limits to the ability to shape the Middle East’s politics from the Oval Office. The US should take a step back, and most importantly, let Jerusalem face the consequences of the occupation by gradually lifting the diplomatic shield it provides Israel with. It should be done in a smart enough way not to hurt the administration politically, but the message needs to be clear: If Israel continues to hold on to the West Bank, it will become more and more isolated. With time, this message would resonate with policy makers and with the Jewish public.
We could also hope that the Palestinians will be able to unite their government, so that when the opportunity presents itself, the leadership that negotiates the end of the occupation would enjoy a greater legitimacy than Abbas and Saeb Erekat did in 2008. Hamas has a veto power over agreements, just as the Israeli Right has. If these forces are not engaged with, there isn’t a plan in the world that would bring peace.
Posted: January 17th, 2011 | Author: noam | Filed under: In the News, the US and us | Tags: akiva eldar, Barak Obama, Benjamin Netanyahu | Comments Off
According to Haaretz’s Akiva Eldar, Obama’s administration is refusing to reveal what happened in the negotiations with Israel and the Palestinians, probably in order not to embarrass Jerusalem:
The U.S. president is sticking to his refusal to declare that the negotiations be based on the 1967 borders. Moreover, the Americans are refraining from issuing any report on the positions held by each side, or from revealing who has shown a map of a permanent status agreement and offered an outline of security arrangements, and who is plucking excuses out of thin air to maintain diplomatic ambiguity.
Read the rest here.
Posted: October 31st, 2010 | Author: noam | Filed under: Uncategorized | Tags: Aluf Benn, Barak Obama, Benjamin Netanyahu, midterm elections, peace process | 1 Comment »
Aluf Benn, Haaretz’s diplomatic correspondent, had this weekend an analysis piece on the possibility the Palestinian Authority will ask a UN recognition of a unilateral declaration of independence.
Benn urged the Israeli government not to automatically object such a move. Israel, he writes, would be better off taking part in shaping a Security Council resolution than in just opposing one. As Ami Kaufman notes, given Israel’s mistrust towards international institutions, it’s a very surprising idea.
Equally interesting is a paragraph in Benn’s piece on Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent diplomatic moves (my italic):
Netanyahu rejected Obama’s request for a two-month extension of the settlement freeze; the president had wanted quiet on the Middle East front while he concentrated on the midterm elections. For his part, Netanyahu explained that he needed to show “credibility and steadfastness” at home, and indeed the incentives promised by the U.S. president in exchange for the extension did not sway the prime minister. One can surmise that Netanyahu did not want to help Obama ahead of the U.S. elections, and thus annoy the president’s Republican rivals. Netanyahu needs the support of GOP politicians to thwart the pressure coming from the White House.
Posted: July 5th, 2010 | Author: noam | Filed under: In the News, the US and us | Tags: abu mazen, arab rejectionism, Barak Obama, Benjamin Netanyahu, dennis ross, diplomacy, joe biden, peace process | 6 Comments »
One of the most repeated talking points of Israeli leaders these days is that by refusing direct negotiations, the Palestinian leadership is proving (again) that it doesn’t want peace. It is, Israelis say, another case of Arab Rejectionism.
Even members of the Israeli Left often wonder: if the Palestinian leadership really wants its own state, why not negotiate? What do they have to lose? After all, they can’t hope for a more sympathetic American administration, so why not take advantage of the current political circumstances, and try to gain something?
I’m not in the business of defending whatever the Palestinian Authority does (clearly an impossible task), but I do think that from his own perspective, Abu-Mazen is doing the right thing in refusing direct negotiations with the Israeli government (or at least postponing it as much as he can). The reason for this is the unbalanced nature of the diplomatic game.
By “unbalanced” I don’t mean that Israel is the strong side. Clearly, Israel has the upper hand from a military perspective, but this is not the important issue on this stage of negotiations. The unbalanced nature of the negotiations refers to the currency both sides are expected to exchange, and the moment in time in which they would exchange it.
It is pretty clear what does the Palestinian Authority want from Israel: land. Israel is expected to leave the territory it captured in 1967, give or take some minor changes. But what does Israel expect to get from the Palestinians? Most people will answer “security”. But that’s not true. Israel’s security will be put at risk by evacuating the land, and there is nothing the Palestinians can say or do that would eliminate this risk. Any kind of agreement Abu-Mazen signs won’t promise that in five, ten or twenty years the Palestinians won’t decide to attack Israel (or Israel the Palestinians, for that matter). The Peace we all hope for will depend on political circumstances and the way both leaderships conduct themselves in the years to come, not on documents they sign today.
The thing that Israel needs from the Palestinians is not security. It’s something even more important, and the one currency Israel was always short of: legitimacy. Legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, and legitimacy in the eyes of most of the Arab world. That what Israel lacks, and that’s what the Arabs have offered it in the 2002 Arab League peace initiative: full legitimacy in exchange for a full withdrawal. Back then Israel declined this offer, so the Palestinians kept hitting it where it hurts, by questioning Israel’s legitimacy in controlling the West bank or even its entire right to exist.
And here is the important part: Israel will gain some legitimacy from the first moment of negotiations, while the Palestinians will get the land only after an agreement is signed, and even this is not certain (Israel have never completed fulfilling its part in the Oslo agreement, for example). In other words, the Palestinians start paying when they enter the negotiating room, while Israelis only pay at the exit.
For an Israeli Prime Minister – given his own political considerations – it will be very tempting to stay in the room forever.
Read the rest of this entry »
Posted: September 2nd, 2009 | Author: noam | Filed under: In the News, The Right, The Settlements, the US and us | Tags: Barak Obama, Benjamin Netanyahu, Benny Kashriel, gush etzion, ma'aleh Adumim, settlements, Shaul Goldstein | Comments Off
Haaretz’s Chaim Levinson got the transcript of a brief meeting between the heads of four major West Bank settlements and Benjamin Netanyahu. The settlers were intended to meet with the director general of the PM’s Office, Eyal Gabai, but Netanyahu did a POTUS-like move, and dropped in to say hello. This is what he heard:
[Ma'aleh Adumim Mayor Benny] Kashriel appears in the minutes as saying: “The [West Bank settlement] heads in Judea and Samaria are in a situation today in which they are humiliated and ridiculed. There was never such a bad period [as the present]. Before the elections, there was talk of construction in settlement blocs. Now we are not seeing an end [of this]. Everything is frozen. Under the prior [Olmert] administration, it was possible to build between houses. Now this is not [allowed]. The situation also has direct economic implications. There is no construction. There is no income from permits, from the sale of land or from property taxes. Charitable foundations are not coming to Judea and Samaria. There was a meeting with the finance minister in which promises were made, but since the approval of the budget, it has not been possible to get [what was promised].”
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Posted: August 26th, 2009 | Author: noam | Filed under: In the News, The Settlements, the US and us | Tags: Barak Obama, Benjamin Netanyahu, Bill Clinton, george mitchell, peace process, settlements | Comments Off
There are signs in the last couple of days that the diplomatic pre-game is about to end, and that we are heading for a renewal of the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
PM Benjamin Netanyahu has met with US envoy George Mitchell today, and although there is no agreement on the settlements freeze the administration demanded (maybe it’s even for the best), there are indications that the Israeli PM understands that if he won’t engage in some sort of meaningful negotiations with the Palestinians, he will end up with a “take it or leave it” American offer on his table, possibly as early as October. Since such a plan would put Netanyahu in a tough corner – he will have to choose between saying yes and losing his coalition to saying no and losing all credibility with Europe and the administration – he probably prefers to deal with Mahmud Abbas personally.
There are also other signals hinting that Netanyahu is willing to take some steps forward. In response to his deputy Moshe Yaalon’s nationalistic statements last week, Netanyahu has reaffirmed his commitment to the two state solution. As Akiva Eldar reported in Haaretz, his aids have even pointed out to foreign diplomats that in his recent remarks, Netanyahu didn’t demand that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish State, as he did previously. There is even some nervousness in the right wing regarding Netanyahu’s plans. I guess that they are sensing something.
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Posted: July 11th, 2009 | Author: noam | Filed under: In the News, The Settlements, the US and us | Tags: Barak Obama, Benjamin Netanyahu, israel hayom, sheldon adelson | Comments Off
cross-posted with FPW.
Israel Hayom, the free paper published by gambling billionaire Sheldon Adelson, quoted a “top Israeli official”, stating that:
The Americans are totally confused. Their foreign policy is collapsing. This chaos can be seen in almost any area where the administration is acting, in the diplomatic effort in our region, in the relations with Iran and in North Korea.
The paper adds that this view is shared by PM Benjamin Netanyahu’s office and the Israeli Foreign Office alike.
It should be noted that Israel Hoyom’s editorial line is known to be very supportive of Netanyahu, and the paper enjoys almost unlimited access to the PM’s people. Netanyahu’s own chief of staff, Nathan Eshel, has worked until the elections in Israel Hayom – so I believe the paper reflects the common view around the PM in saying that “the (American) administration is trying to form a regional plan – but has no idea how it is going to be done.”
What’s important here is not whether Israeli officials are right or not in thinking the administration lacks a coherent policy for the region (it’s too hard to tell at this point) – but rather the fact that the Israelis think so, and will probably behave accordingly.
In the last few weeks, it seems that the hostile atmosphere in Israel towards the new administration is playing into Netanyahu’s hands. At the moment his coalition is very stable, and it appears as though the PM believes he was able to contain the pressure from Washington. As long as the Palestinian Authority and the Hamas are not able to work some sort of a deal and form a united government, and while there is no serious peace initiative from the American side, the Israeli government will not grant the administration with any more concessions.
The talks between Israeli officials and the special envoy George Mitchell regarding the settlements go on and on – and can continue forever, for all the Israelis care. It the administration doesn’t want to lose the momentum from Obama’s speech in Cairo, it’s time to make the next move.
Posted: June 22nd, 2009 | Author: noam | Filed under: In the News | Tags: Ali Khamenei, Angela Merkel, Barak Obama, cast lead, egypt, Gaza, hamas, Hizbullah, Iran, karubi, lebanon, mir hossein mousavi, north korea, palestinians, PLO, rafsanjani | Comments Off
UPDATE: I’m going on a vacation, so I probably won’t be posting for the next 10 days or so.
cross-psoted with FPW.
Let’s admit it – there is almost no reliable news as to what is actually happening in Iran. The pictures from the last couple of days don’t show the mass demonstrations of the first few days following the presidential elections. It seems that the number of protesters dropped from hundreds of thousands to just thousands and even hundreds. If this is so, it could be a bad sign for the reformist camp. On the other hand, the political heat is still on: Friday’s warnings from he supreme leader Ali Khamenei not only failed to calm the streets, but seemed to toughen the position of the reformist leaders – Mousavi, Karubi, and above all, Rafsanjani. Again, most of the political drama is probably happening backstage, so we can’t know anything for sure.
Western leaders – probably under public pressure – are starting to take a more committed stand on the reformists’ side. Germany’s Angela Merkel took a firm position in support of the opposition, but the UK government and the American administration still chose their words very carefully. As I wrote before, too-overt support statements could end up doing do more harm than good, but on the other hand, when Iranians are calling “death to the dictator”, the careful language of president Obama seems somewhat out of sync with his inspiring speech in Cairo.
One thing is very clear right now – the Iranian “Islamic revolution” model has suffered a tremendous blow. Even if the Iranian leadership can sort the mess without sharing power with the reformists (something which doesn’t seem very likely now), it is clear that the system as a whole doesn’t enjoy the legitimacy that everyone though it did. The Iranian leadership will have to be a lot more careful from now on, and concentrate on internal stability. It is not sure how much effort it will put on exporting the revolution, and on supporting Hamas and Hizbullah.
Read the rest of this entry »
Posted: June 16th, 2009 | Author: noam | Filed under: In the News, the US and us | Tags: Barak Obama, iran protest, Jim Muir, mahmoud ahmadinejad, mir hossein mousavi | Comments Off
Don’t miss this excellent analysis by the BBC’s Jim Muir of the political situation in Iran (with notes on the growing protest’s implications on all key players).
Muir also makes an interesting point on the way the unexpected developments surrounding the elections have damaged President’s Obama’s plans to engage in a dialogue with the regime in Tehran.
For Mr Obama to have opened dialogue with Tehran under a credibly-re-elected Mr Ahmadinejad would have been difficult enough in US domestic political terms.
But American experts on US-Iran relations believe his task will be considerably complicated in Congress and elsewhere should the election be seen as rigged and the results imposed by repression.
The outcome has also played into the hands of Benjamin Netanyahu’s hardline government in Israel.
Under pressure to come up with what it regards as concessions on the Palestinian issue, Mr Netanyahu has tried to argue that priority should go to what he sees as the true threat to the region – Iran.
If the Iranian election crisis is not somehow defused, he will clearly find it easier to argue his case that “the biggest threat to Israel, the Middle East and the entire world is the crossing of a nuclear weapon with radical Islam” and that there should be “an international coalition against the nuclear arming of Iran”, as he said in his policy speech on Sunday.